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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Cette étude propose une comparaison entre deux structures d’échanges dans les marchés financiers: les 
marchés aux enchères et les marchés de contreparties. Les marchés aux enchères sont concentrés et 
régis par les ordres alors que les marchés de contreparties sont fragmentés et régis par les prix. Par 
rapport à la littérature, cette comparaison se base sur les deux dimensions qui distinguent les deux 
structures, à savoir le timing de soumettre des ordres (marchés dirigés par les ordres et marchés dirigés 
par les prix) et le niveau de concentration dans les deux marchés (centralisation et fragmentation). De 
plus, la comparaison utilise différentes mesures de performances des marchés: robustesse aux 
problèmes d’asymétrie d’information, efficience informationnelle, variance des prix, agressivité des 
ordres des informés et la liquidité du marché. On montre que l’utilisation des deux dimensions qui 
distinguent les deux structures aboutit à des résultats parfois complètement contraires à ceux 
préconisés dans d’autres études utilisant une seule des deux dimensions. En effet, on montre que les 
marchés aux enchères sont moins sensibles aux problèmes d’asymétrie d’information et sont plus 
efficients. Pour la variance des prix, l’agressivité des stratégies des informés et la profondeur du 
marché, la comparaison dépend du nombre d’agents dans les marchés. 
 




This paper compares two market structures, namely auction and dealership markets defined 
respectively as centralized order-driven and fragmented quote-driven markets. Our approach departs 
from previous works comparing these market mechanisms by considering both the timing of order 
submission (quote versus order-driven) and trading concentration (centralized versus fragmented) as 
dimensions di.erentiating these trading structures. We compare markets using measures of market 
viability, informational e.ciency, price variance, informed trading aggressiveness and market liquidity. 
We find that this approach changes dramatically the results of previous works comparing these 
trading structures. Indeed, we prove that auction markets are less sensitive to asymmetric information 
problem and they exhibit higher level of informational e.ciency than dealership markets. Moreover, we 
find that the relative magnitude of price variance, informed trading aggressiveness and market depth 
in both structures depend on the market thickness. 
 
Keywords: Auction Markets, dealership markets, market performances, 
concentration. 
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Since the mid-eighties, ﬁnancial markets were subject to spectacular structural, technological
and regulatory changes. All these changes gave rise to a large number of trading structures
resulting in each market establishing its own functioning rules. The rules governing the func-
tioning of any market can be of two kinds: structural or organizational. Structural rules
regulate the trading method and market participants. Organizational rules instead discipline
some practical aspects such as the minimum price tick size, capacity of trading for brokers,
delays of disclosure of information about trades, etc...
In spite of this diversity, each trading structure may be described as an hybrid version of two
basic market structures: auction and dealership markets. Understanding the relative merits
of each of these pure trading mechanisms is an important issue from a normative standpoint
because it would allow to better design the speciﬁc hybrid version. Comparing these structures
w o u l da l s oh e l pt od e a lw i t ht h eo p t i m a ls t r u c t u r ei s s u e .
Auction and dealership markets diﬀer along many dimensions and in rather subtle ways.
Two dimensions may however be considered as the main structural properties distinguishing
them. These dimensions are the degree of concentration of trading (centralized versus frag-
mented) and the timing of order submission for liquidity providers (quote and order-driven
markets). Auction markets are concentrated order-driven markets while dealership markets are
fragmented quote-driven.
In this paper, we compare these trading structures by looking at both dimensions distin-
guishing them. In an asymmetric information framework, these dimensions lead to diﬀerent
levels of information available to market participants and in particular to liquidity providers.
In order-driven markets, traders act simultaneously without knowing the prices and liquidity
providers observe traders’ order ﬂow before they choose their strategies. Conversely, in quote-
driven markets, dealers begin the trading process by posting prices. A main consequence of
the diﬀerent timing of order submission is that liquidity providers compete diﬀerently. In fact,
in the order-driven markets they compete on quantities while in the quote-driven markets they
are engaged in price competition. Furthermore, dealers in fragmented markets have no infor-
mation about trading costs or trading sizes of their competitors because trades are executed in
bilateral meetings. They can only try to elicit some private information from individual orders.
In contrast, in concentrated markets, market makers learn more information about the ﬁnal
asset value because they trade with more than only one counterpart.
1In the literature, the comparison between auction and dealership markets is generally based
either on the timing of order submission (see for instance, Pithyachariyakul (1986), Madhavan
(1992), Shin (1996), Bernhardt and Hughson (1996) and Viswanathan and Wang (2002)), or
on the concentration of trading (see e.g. Mendelson (1987), Pagano and R¨ oell (1996) and Biais
(1993)). The introduction of both dimensions to distinguish auction and dealership markets in
our work is motivated by two main considerations.
First, we believe that introducing concentration in auction markets is a more realistic repre-
sentation of ﬁnancial markets having a continuous auction structure. By assuming that auction
markets are centralized, we argue that the limit-order book may contain more than only one
order submitted by traders even when trading occurs continuously. This argument suggests
that, at each moment, each submitted order could be executed either against outstanding or-
ders on the limit order book or against orders coming from liquidity providers; hence, each
trader should consider the fact that her order is in competition with orders submitted by other
traders. In the previous literature, this kind of model describes periodic auction markets (or
batch auctions), so that the diﬀerence between batch markets and continuous markets is merely
based on centralization in the sense that auction markets are the ones where there is only one
order submitted by traders.1 This approach ignores that orders in periodic markets are sub-
mitted sequentially between execution rounds. So, in periodic markets, each trader chooses his
optimal strategy given the information he can infer from the existing order ﬂow.2
Second, intuition suggests that there is a trade oﬀ between concentration of trading and
timing of order submission with respect to their impact on the market performances. This
is also supported by some existing results in the literature. For instance, Madhavan (1992)
proves that fragmented quote-driven markets are less sensitive to asymmetric information than
fragmented order-driven markets. However, when we introduce the concentration of trading to
characterize auction markets, it is clear that because of the higher transparency, concentrated
order-driven markets may become more viable than fragmented quote-driven markets.
Another important contribution of our paper is to compare auction and dealership market
with respect to diﬀerent measures of market quality like market viability, price variability,
trading aggressiveness of informed traders and market liquidity. In addition to this, we evaluate
each trading structure from the point of view of a) policy makers, who need to choose the
1See Madhavan (1992) and Pagano and Ro¨ ell (1996).
2Under this distinction between continuous and periodic auction markets, the modeling of trade in batch
markets must be carried out by using a dynamic model so as to consider the adjustments of each trader’s
strategy to those already displayed on the screen.
2optimal trading structure; b) investors, who need to decide in which market to invest, and c)
ﬁrms, which have to choose where to be listed.
We show that concentration decreases the informational disadvantage of liquidity providers
leading to lower sensitivity of auction markets to asymmetric information. In the same way, we
prove that concentration allows a higher informational transmission among market participants
generating higher informational eﬃciency in auction markets. Empirically, these results suggest
that auction structure should be more suitable for markets with higher level of asymmetric
information. By studying IPOs, Falconieri, Murphy and Weaver (2003) document that the
level of underpricing is higher in the NASDAQ (a dealership like structure) than in the NYSE
(an auction like structure). This is exactly what our theoretical result predicts.
For informed agents aggressiveness, price variance and market liquidity, we ﬁnd that compar-
ison between markets depend on their thickness. For the ﬁrst measure, it is commonly argued
that informed traders will follow more aggressive strategies in quote-driven markets because of
their opacity. If we consider concentration, relative opacity is higher in fragmented quote-driven
markets which would accentuate the use of aggressive strategies by informed agents in these
markets. However, by introducing concentration, an opposite eﬀect arises. Indeed, concentra-
tion decreases the informational advantage of informed agents because of the higher information
transmission among market participants. In this case, informed agents may trade more aggres-
sively in auction markets in order to counterbalance the loss of informational advantage. We
prove that this latter eﬀect dominates the ﬁrst one in thick markets. Hence, in thick markets,
informed agents strategies are more aggressive in auction markets than in dealership markets,
and vice versa.
A similar reasoning may be applied to price variance. Price distortions in order-driven
markets increase price variance in these markets. Even if concentration ampliﬁes this ﬁrst
eﬀect, an opposite eﬀect arises. Indeed, less asymmetric information decreases the variance
of prices. This latter eﬀect will dominate in thick markets, leading to lower price variance in
auction markets.
Finally, concentration and timing of order submission have opposite eﬀects on market depth.
Concentration leads indeed to lower marginal eﬀect of individual orders, making concentrated
markets deeper. On the other hand, quote-driven markets seem to be deeper because com-
petition between liquidity providers in these markets is based on prices leading to lower price
sensitivity to traders’ orders. We prove that, the concentration eﬀect dominates when the
number of liquidity providers is suﬃciently large, and vice versa.
3The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the next section spells out the model
which is based on Glosten (1989) and Madhavan (1992). Then, in section 3, auction and
dealership markets are characterized. Thereafter, in sections 4 and 5, equilibria in dealership
and auction markets are derived and some of their properties are described. The comparison
is exposed in section 6, and ﬁnally we conclude by some remarks and possible extensions. All
proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The model
We consider a simple one-period model in which agents liquidate their positions after trading
occurrence.3 There are two assets in the market: risk-free asset (cash), and a risky asset with
a stochastic liquidation value denoted by ˜ v.
Two types of agents participate in the market: Traders and liquidity providers (or market
makers). Each of the N risk averse traders (indexed by i =1 ,...N) chooses a trading strategy
that maximizes his expected utility given his information set Hi. This set contains his private
information that represents his trading motivations, public information and the information
related to the trading structure. On the other hand, M risk neutral4 market makers (indexed
by m =1 ,...M) provide liquidity to traders. They behave strategically and maximize their
expected proﬁts conditional on their information sets φm. These sets contain public information
and information related to the trading mechanism.
Each trader i is assumed to have a negative exponential utility function U(Wi)=−e−ρWi,
where ρ is the coeﬃcient of risk aversion and Wi is his ﬁnal wealth.
Trader i’s private information is described by a vector (si,ω i); si is his private signal about
the ﬁnal value of the risky asset and ωi is his initial endowments5. We assume that, for the
rest of the market, endowments are normally distributed with mean 0 and precision πω.T h e
private signal of trader i is modeled as a noisy observation of the ﬁnal value:
˜ si = v +˜  i.
We assume that, for all i,˜  i are independently normally distributed with mean 0 and precision
π . It is publicly known that the ﬁnal value of the risky asset is normally distributed with
3As in Madhavan (1992), we can easily extend this analysis to a multi-period framework where private
information lasts only one period. To simplify notation we omit this extention without loss of generality.
4As suggested by Pagano and R¨ oell (1993) and Gould and Verrechia (1985), market makers should be
suﬃciently less risk averse than traders so as to keep a certain level of market viability. Moreover, risk neutrality
in this model avoids the inventory costs problems that risk averse market makers would face.
5We could also see ωi as a liquidity shock for the traders’ portfolios.
4mean µ and precision πv; therefore, given his signal si, the trader i considers that ˜ v is normally
distributed with mean si and precision π .
This structure of private information with two sources of uncertainty allows the existence
of diﬀerent trading motivations and the introduction of adverse selection problems in this
model of asymmetric information. Indeed, when a liquidity provider observes a large purchase
[respectively sell] order, he cannot know whether it comes from an information-based trader,
i.e., a trader having a good signal (si is high) [respectively, si is low], or from a liquidity-based
trader who trades for hedging reasons because of his initial endowments (−ωi is large) [ωi is
large].6
For each agent i,w h e nqi is the quantity of risky assets demanded (or oﬀered) and p is the
related unit price, his ﬁnal wealth is ˜ Wi =( qi+ωi)˜ v−pqi.I fqi > 0, the trader i is a buyer and
if qi < 0 he is a seller. Since his ﬁnal wealth is normally distributed and he has an exponential
utility function, the objective function of trader i is:




where E[./Hi]a n dvar[./Hi] are expectation and variance operators conditional on Hi.
Public information contains market exogenous parameters (e.g., number of agents for each
type, absolute risk aversion), the distributions of the asset’s liquidity value, the noise about
private observations and trader’s initial endowments of risky assets. The last component of all
agents’ information sets are those related to market structures; they will be presented in the
following description of market organizations.
2.1 Auction markets (or centralized order-driven markets)
In auction markets, traders begin the trading process by choosing their strategies given their
information sets, and then, simultaneously, submit their orders to be displayed on the screen.
After observing the traders’ order ﬂow, market makers determine their trading strategies and
submit their orders. All orders are accumulated and executed at a single clearing price.
These markets are order-driven because trading is started up by traders’ orders. All strate-
gies are chosen before the price is ﬁxed. Rational traders will then submit quantity-price
6As in Biais, Martimort and Rochet (2000), this setting is a two dimensional adverse selection problem which
is technically extremely complex to solve. CARA utility functions and normal distributions allow to reduce this
problem to a one dimensional adverse selection problem using a variable which is a linear combination of private
signals and liquidity shocks.
5schedules.7 So, for each possible price, the trader will adjust his beliefs about the asset’s ﬁnal
value given the information transmitted in this price. He considers the eﬀect of his strategy on
the market clearing price.
In the model of Madhavan (1992), it is considered that at each trading round in continuous
order-driven markets there exists only one trader in the market. On the contrary, we assume
in this work that auction markets are also centralized. Under this more general modeling (in
some sense, without restriction on market liquidity), we assume that, at each trading round,
there are N traders submitting orders for the risky asset. Consequently, each trader should not
consider only his own eﬀect on the price but also the eﬀects of his competitors’ orders.
The role of market makers in these markets is to provide liquidity for traders. They are
institutional investors or intermediaries who respond to the order ﬂow displayed on the screen.
Because these markets are characterized by a higher degree of transparency, market makers
are assumed to be symmetrically informed about market parameters and order ﬂow. Each
market maker submits a quantity-price schedule that maximizes his expected proﬁts given his
competitors’ trading strategies. Therefore, competition between them is based on quantities
and their eﬀect on the equilibrium price is drawn through the eﬀect of their orders on the
market clearing condition.
An important aspect distinguishing trading structures is the information sets available for
each market participant before choosing his trading strategy. Each agent i0s information set Hi
contains no information about markets since traders will begin the trading process. For market
makers, φm contains the aggregate order ﬂow Q submitted by traders.8 Therefore:
Hi = {PI,(si,ω i)} for all i =1 ,...,N
and
φm = {PI,Q} for all m =1 ,...,M
(where PI = public information).
We denote the vector of traders’ demand functions by   Q = {q1(p),...,qN(p)} and the vector
of dealers’ demand functions by   d = {d1(p),...,dM(p)}. For all i, let   Q−i be the RN−1 vector of
7See Brown and Zhang (1997) where traders are compelled to submit market orders in auction markets (even
though they term this structure “ dealer markets”).
8This represents a low level of transparency for auction markets. However, we can imagine a more trans-
parent auction market in which market makers observe orders separately. Within the present model (normal
distributions, CARA utility function and rational expectation framework), this higher transparency has no
eﬀect on equilibrium outcomes.
6all the other traders, i.e.,   Q−i = {q1(p),.,q i−1(p),q i+1(p),..,qN(p)}.We deﬁne   d−m for dealers
i nt h es a m ew a y .W ed e ﬁne an equilibrium in auction markets as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 : The Bayesian Nash equilibrium in auction markets is deﬁned by the set (p∗,   Q,   d)
such that:








∗)=0 ( 1 )
(ii) for all i ∈ {1,..,N}, q∗
i(p) is trader i’s strategy satisfying his optimality condition, given
the trading strategies of other market participants and given his information set:
q
∗
i(p) ∈ argmaxq(p){E[f W/Hi,p,  d,   Q−i] −
ρ
2
var[f W/H i,p,  d,   Q−i]} (2)
(iii) for all m ∈ {1,...,M}, d∗
m(p) is the market maker’s trading strategy satisfying the op-
timality of his expected proﬁts conditional on the trading strategies of other market participants
and his information set:
d
∗
m(p) ∈ argmaxdm(p){E[(˜ v − p)dm(p)/φm,p,  Q,   d−m]} (3)
subject to non negativity.
2.2 Dealership markets (or fragmented quote-driven markets)
Each trading period in dealership markets may be divided in two sub-periods. In the ﬁrst sub-
period, dealers begin by setting their bid-ask prices. Unlike market makers in auction markets,
dealers compete in prices because of their status of price setters. Then, each trader chooses the
best price for his unique order among dealers’ quotations.9
Dealership markets are quote-driven since trading is guided by quotes set by diﬀerent dealers.
Because he cannot observe traders’ orders, each dealer sets a price-quantity schedule so that,
for each possible order size, he will extract all available information from this order.
These markets are also fragmented because trading occurs after pairwise meetings between
dealers and traders. Hence, during the trading process, neither the dealer nor the trader is
9Note that it is supposed that traders cannot split their orders among dealers. This may occur, for instance,
because of higher ﬁxed transaction fees. See Dennert (1993) and Biais, Martimort and Rochet (2000) for models
of dealer competition where traders are allowed to split their orders among dealers. Biais, Foucault and Salani´ e
(1998) prove the importance of allocation rules when traders can split their orders among dealers.
7informed about other simultaneous trades on the market, if there is any. Because of this
opacity, the price is aﬀected by only one order.
Since they move ﬁrst in the dealership trading process by setting their price-quantity sched-
ules, dealers have no private information either about order ﬂow or about the asset’s value. This
suggests that dealers, like market makers in auction markets, are symmetrically informed before
they set their prices. This occurs either because of the Mandatory Last Trade Displaying rule
or by assuming that each dealer can observe his competitors’ pricing function and can perfectly
learn all their private information. Obviously, we can consider another modeling of dealership
markets with a higher degree of opacity when last trade publication is not mandatory10 and
where dealers cannot extract all private information from the pricing functions of informed
dealers, or they cannot observe them.11
Since dealers compete on prices, using the standard argument for “Bertrand” games in these
markets where risk neutral dealers are symmetrically informed, the unique Nash equilibrium
for each of them is to set prices at the break-even level, i.e., prices equal the asset’s expected
value conditional on the order size and dealers’ information set. In fact, if dealers set prices to
make positive expected proﬁt s ,i ti sa l w a y sp r o ﬁtable for one dealer to undercut them.12
The information sets are φm = {PI} for dealers and Hi = {p(.),PI,(si,ω i)} for traders.
In dealership markets, the equilibrium is deﬁned by the dealer’s common pricing function p(.)
and traders’ orders q(si,ω i)a sf o l l o w s :
Deﬁnition 2 : The equilibrium in dealership markets is a diﬀerentiable price function and a
corresponding demand q(si,ω i) such that:
( i )p r i c e ss a t i s f yt h ez e r o - e x p e c t e dp r o ﬁt condition for dealers:
p(q)=E[˜ v/φm,q]=E[˜ v/PI,q]. (4)
10See Madhavan (1995) for a theoretical analysis of the mandatory trade publication in fragmented and
centralized markets. Gemmil (1996) provides an empirical evidence on the irrelevance of delayed publication
on market liquidity by comparing the SEAQ’s liquidity under three regimes of publication. He argues that
competition between dealers prevents them from exploiting the potential advantage that a delay provides.
11See Biais, Martimort and Rochet (2000) for a model of competition between market makers in a mechanism
design framework. In another context, Bernhardt and Hughson (1996) analyse the case of a competitive dealers
environment and consider the eﬀect of the price tick size on the strategic behavior of dealers. See also Dennert
(1993) for a game theoretical analysis of competition between dealers.
12More precisely, price function is equal to the break-even level because of market opacity and because of the
fact that traders cannot split their order among dealers. Under the same conditions of risk neutrality, symmetric
information and price competition, when traders are allowed to split their orders and dealers are allowed to
observe all trading strategies of traders with their competitors, Biais, Martimort and Rochet (2000) prove that,
with a ﬁnite number of dealers, equilibrium prices are diﬀerent from the break-even level.
8(ii) each trader i maximizes his expected utility given the pricing function and his informa-
tion set:
q(si,ω i) ∈ argmaxq{E[U(Wi(q)/Hi,p]}. (5)
Once equilibria in both markets are deﬁned and trading structures are presented, we derive
these equilibria and establish their principal features.
3 Equilibrium in auction markets
We will focus on symmetric linear equilibria to make comparison between auction and dealership
mechanisms more tractable. As suggested in Madhavan (1992), one may argue that these linear
equilibria are “the most natural equilibria given the computational burden facing agents in the
economy”.A sp r o p o s e di nd e ﬁnition 1, the equilibrium is Bayesian-Nash. In this equilibrium,
each trader determines his optimal trading strategy in order to maximize his expected proﬁts
given his conjectures about the trading strategies of the other informed traders. The conjecture
of each identical informed trader must be correct conditional on each trader’s information.
Proposition 1 :
Let ψ and ψm be deﬁned as follows: ψ = πv + π  +( N − 1)π and ψm = πv + Nπ; where




π [(M + N − 1)(2ψ − ψm)+πv]





there exists an equilibrium for auction markets in which
(i)The strategy function of each market maker m is:
dm(p)=ζ(µ − p), (6)
(ii)The demand function of each trader i is:
qi(si,ω i,p)=αµ + βsi − γωi − θp, (7)
(iii) the equilibrium price is:






i=1 qi and α, β, γ, θ and ζ are positive constants deﬁned in the Appendix. Otherwise,
there is no linear equilibrium and market breaks down.




πω} is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
equilibrium existence in auction markets. The left hand side may be interpreted as a measure
of asymmetric information between traders and market makers. It indeed depends on ψ and
ψm which are the adjusted precisions of the asset’s value distribution for respectively informed
traders and market makers. The information conveyed by each conjectured trader’s strategy
allows an additional precision about the asset’s value of π; then, for each trader, given his
conjectures about the (N −1) other traders, the precision of the asset’s value is the sum of his
precision given his information set (πv+πε)a n dt h e( N −1) additional precision ( so (N −1)π).
On the other hand, for each market maker, given his conjectures about the traders’ strategies,
the precision of the distribution of the asset’s value is the additional precision inferred by
theses strategies (Nπ)a n dt h eex ante precision πv. Note that this measure of asymmetric
information increases when π  is large relative to πv, i.e., when traders’ private information
is precise compared to public information about the ﬁnal asset’s value. Conversely, when πv
is high and π  is low, i.e., when private signal does not present a substantial improvement
of information about the ﬁnal asset’s value, then
π [(M+N−1)(2ψ−ψm)+πv]
[(M+N−1)ψm−πv] is low, which may be
interpreted as lower asymmetric information.
The right hand side of the condition for equilibrium existence (
ρ2
πω), may be seen as a
measure of liquidity-motivated trading which depends on trader’s risk aversion and the precision
of liquidity shocks. When traders are more risk averse or when the variance of their initial
endowments is high (πω is low), traders are more likely to be liquidity motivated. Hence,
equilibrium in auction market exists when asymmetric information is less important than non-
information trading motivation. Otherwise, market makers’ informational disadvantage relative
to traders is so severe that they cannot avoid negative expected proﬁts and market breaks down.
Obviously, higher private information precision or lower precision of prior distribution of the
asset’s value for uninformed market makers lead to higher asymmetric information relatively
to liquidity measure and then to lower market viability. On the other hand, in order to study
the eﬀects of ρ and πω on market viability, we need to study the variations of both measures
with these parameters. As mentioned above, non-information motivation measure is increasing
in ρ and decreasing in πω. For the asymmetric information measure, substitution of the values
of π, ψ and ψm, in the left hand side of the equilibrium existence condition gives
π [(M + N)πv +( M + N − 1)π (2 +
(N−2)π πω
π πω+ρ2 )]






2π [N(M + N − 1)π  +( M +2 N − 2)πv]











Then the asymmetric information measure is increasing in ρ and decreasing in πω. In lemma
1 (see the appendix), we study the eﬀect of increasing liquidity motivation on auction market
viability. We ﬁnd that the marginal eﬀect of an increase in the liquidity trading measure on
the asymmetric information measure is lower than 1. Then, when we increase risk aversion or
initial endowments variance, liquidity measure increases more than the asymmetric information
measure. Thus, the viability of auction markets increases with risk aversion and the variance
of initial endowments.
Further, in the proof of proposition 1, we show that ζ is positive. Hence, market makers
buy when prices are low and sell when prices are high. This means that liquidity providers
have a stabilizing behavior, even in a model where they behave as proﬁt-maximizers and not
as social welfare maximizers.
Finally, we can easily see that the measure of asymmetric information is a decreasing func-
tion of N. Intuitively, when the number of traders on the market increases, market makers
gather more information from observed variables (the precision of their learned information is
[πv + Nπ]) which decreases their informational disadvantage and then, induces them to take
the opposite side of the market, leading to higher viability for auction markets.
As for traders’ number, the measure of asymmetric information decreases with the number
of market makers. Indeed, a larger number of market makers decreases the marginal amount
of asymmetric information supported by each one of them, what reduces their reluctance to
take the opposite side of the market and then enhances market viability. The equilibrium in
the limit case, i.e., when the number of market makers is extremely large, is characterized in
Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 : With market maker’s free entry, i.e., when M −→ +∞, equilibrium in
auction markets always exists and:
(i) β → b0
(ii) α → 0




(v) θ → b0.






ρ(πv +( N − 1)π)
Proposition 2 shows that free entry of market makers in auction markets raises traders’ ag-
gressiveness (β takes the maximal value that satisﬁes the dealers’ second order condition). This
occurs because of the centralization feature of auction markets. Indeed, since market makers
are numerous, the marginal eﬀect of one trader’s order on the equilibrium price is suﬃciently
small to allow him to trade more aggressively according to his private information and to carry
less about market makers’ adjustments about the ﬁnal value of the asset. Furthermore, as pre-
dicted, the quantity demanded by traders (which is ﬁnite) is shared between all market makers,
and their individual order size tends towards zero.
In the following proposition, we derive some features of the equilibrium in auction markets,
when it exists, in order to use them subsequently when we begin comparison between structures.
Proposition 3 : When symmetric linear equilibrium exists for auction markets, then:
(i) equilibrium price is not semi-strong form eﬃcient. This eﬃciency level is reached with
market makers’ free entry,
(ii) the variance of the equilibrium price tends towards zero when N → +∞,
(iii) with free entry, the quoted bid-ask spread tends to 2π
boπv.
In part (i) of proposition 3 we prove that equilibrium price in auction markets is not semi-
strong form eﬃcient because of market makers’ quantity-based competition which induces a
diﬀerence between equilibrium price and the expected value of the asset conditional on the
extracted information from the price function and public information. This diﬀerence disap-
pears with free entry because competition between market makers, even if it is quantity-based,
becomes a perfect competition leading price to the semi-strong form eﬃciency level. In part
(ii), it is shown that, when the number of traders becomes suﬃciently large, market makers’
precision of extracted information increases and price tends towards the asset’s value v.F i -
nally, in part (iii), we show that the quoted bid-ask spread in auction markets (which is equal
to p(1) − p(−1)) tends to its minimal value with free entry because, in this case, numerous
market makers share the risk between them and the “marginal” informational risk borne by
each of them is minimized.
124 Equilibrium in dealership markets
Equilibrium in these markets is derived as in Glosten (1989) and Madhavan (1992).13 By using
our notations we get the following proposition.








πvρ2 − π πω(π  + πv)
ρ[πvρ2 + π πω(π  + πv)]
[−π µ + π si − ρωi]. (10)
This equilibrium exists only if πvρ2 >π  πω(π  + πv); Otherwise, there is no equilibrium price
schedule and market breaks down.
In proposition 4, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for equilibrium existence is






If traders’ signal precision is suﬃciently high, or dealers’ prior precision about the ﬁnal security’s
value is suﬃciently low, this leads to market failure. Intuitively, when information asymmetry is
large, then dealers’ informational disadvantage relative to traders is so severe that they cannot
m a k en o nn e g a t i v ee x p e c t e dp r o ﬁts. They will refuse to make transactions. Nevertheless, if
traders’ non-information related motivations for trade are important, dealers are urged to take
the opposite side of the market even with information asymmetry. Liquidity related motives
for trade depend on traders’ risk aversion and the precision of their initial endowments.
Contrary to auction markets, note that the equilibrium outcomes in dealership markets
depend neither on the number of traders nor on that of dealers. This is directly linked to
the structure of the trading in these markets. Symmetric behavior of dealers and the fact
that trading is involved in dealership markets after pairwise meetings between traders and
dealers entail this independence between equilibrium and the number of each type of market
participants in the market. However, the extreme fragmentation considered in these model
where each dealer cannot receive more than one order, induces that this equilibrium outcomes
are realized for M>N .
13See proposition 1 in Glosten (1989) and proposition 1 in Madhavan (1992).
13As in auction markets, we derive in the following proposition some useful features of the
equilibrium in dealership markets.
Proposition 5 : In dealership market, when equilibrium exists, we have:
(i) prices are semi-strong form eﬃcient,
(ii) price variance is equal to π
(πv+π)2,
(iii) the quoted bid-ask spread is an increasing function of π  and πω a n dad e c r e a s i n g
function of πv and ρ.
The explicit bid-ask spread in these markets is an increasing function of the trader’s or-
der size, reﬂecting the response of dealers to the asymmetric information problem they face.
Furthermore, the quoted bid-ask spread is an increasing function of π  and πω,a n dad e c r e a s -
ing function of ρ and πv. Thus, when trader’s private information about the asset’s value is
more precise or when their initial endowments are less variable, dealers’ beliefs that trading is
information-motivated increases leading to an increase in the adverse selection problem, and
consequently to an increase in the bid-ask spread. On the contrary, when traders are more risk
averse or when dealers have enough information about the risky asset (πv is higher), asymmet-
ric information is no longer severe and traders are more likely to be liquidity-motivated which
induces a decrease of bid-ask spreads.
5 Market performances and trading structures
In this section, we compare trading equilibria in both structures. Diﬀerent indicators are used
to measure market performances. For each measure, we will discuss the implications of our
results on policy makers and investors decisions.
5.1 Market viability
Market viability reﬂects the ability of the trading structure to be less sensitive to asymmet-
ric information between diﬀerent participants. In particular, it measures the willingness of
liquidity providers (market makers in auction markets and dealers in dealership markets) to
take the opposite side of the market even when they are informationally disadvantaged relative
to traders. From Proposition 1 and Proposition 4, market viability in both markets is mea-
sured by the conditions of existence of equilibria. We say that one market is more viable when
14its equilibrium existence condition is satisﬁed each time the equilibrium exists on the other
market.14
Proposition 6 : Auction markets are always more viable than dealership markets; indeed,
equilibrium existence conditi o ni na u c t i o nm a r k e t si ss a t i s ﬁed each time trading in dealership
markets exists. Moreover, when










(M + N − 2)ρ2 − (M + N)π πω
− (N − 1)
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2πω




ρ2 − π πω
,
equilibrium exists only in auction markets.
Madhavan (1992) shows that fragmented quote-driven markets are more robust to prob-
lems of asymmetric information than fragmented order-driven markets. Proposition 6 states
that introducing concentration in order-driven markets contradicts this results since in this
case auction markets are more viable than fragmented quote-driven markets. This is directly
attributable to the higher level of information conveyed in concentrated markets; indeed, this
higher level of information decreases the market makers’ informational disadvantage relative to
dealers operating in more opaque markets which incites them to take the opposite side of the
market in auction structure. For some values of private information precision, it is possible that
the precision of public information is such that auction markets exist but dealership markets
do not. Again, this is directly attributable to the concentration that enhances market makers’
informativeness and incites them to provide liquidity on auction markets while dealers will
not since their informational disadvantage is so high that they cannot trade without bearing
losses.15
14In this work, we consider only linear equilibria for auction markets. This restriction has no eﬀect on the
result related to the market viability. We prove indeed that auction market are more viable than dealership
markets even under this restriction. This result holds when we consider other equilibria in auction markets.
15Glosten (1994) gets a similar result about the viability of auction markets. In his model, he proved, under
more general conditions, that auction markets (which have the same structure as the limit order book analyzed in
that work) does not invite competition from third market dealers, while other trading institutions do. However,
the comparison in Glosten (1994) is focused on the outcome for an agent who is in competition with the existing
limit order book (with an inﬁnite number of market makers) by oﬀering a liquidity providing services. It is
shown that this agent will always earn negative expected proﬁts. On the contrary, these expected proﬁts may
be positive if this agent would compete with another existing trading structure. This may be interpreted here
by considering that another trading alternative enhances the market viability in dealership markets contrary to
auction markets.
15Several regulating incentives and decision rules for investors may be deduced from this result.
First, consider a ﬁrm going public and having the possibility to choose between dealership and
auction structures. The IPOs environment is characterized by a higher level of asymmetric
information. Underpricing is also another peculiar feature of IPOs that is mainly explained
by arguments related to the level of asymmetric information between agents. Proposition 6
suggests that ﬁrms are better oﬀ going public in an auction structure since this will increase
the probability of success of their introductions. In terms of underpricing, this means that
it should be higher in dealership markets because of the lower robustness of this structure
to asymmetric information. This result is conﬁrmed empirically in Falconieri, Murphy and
Weaver (2003) where it is documented that the level of underpricing is higher in the NASDAQ
(a dealership like structure) than in the NYSE (an auction like structure).
Second, market viability in practice is related to trading halts and circuit breakers. Propo-
sition 6 suggests that a ﬁrm quoted in both structures will be less exposed to trading halts,
caused by asymmetric information problem, than a ﬁrm quoted only in a dealership structure.16
Third, from a policy making point of view, dealership markets need a higher standards of
information disclosure about ﬁrms than auction markets in order to alleviate the asymmetric
information problem.
5.2 Traders’ aggressiveness
Trading aggressiveness of informed traders is measured in both markets by the marginal eﬀect
of increasing one trader’s private signal on his trading strategy. This reﬂects the importance
of private information for this informed trader in his trading strategy. In auction markets, it is
equal to β a n di nd e a l e r s h i pm a r k e t st o :
βD =
π [πvρ2 − π πω(π  + πv)]
ρ[πvρ2 + π πω(π  + πv)]
which is equal to:
πv(π  − 2π) − π π
ρ(πv + π)
.
It is commonly argued that, because of opacity, informed traders trade more aggressively in
fragmented quote-driven markets than in fragmented order-driven markets. If we consider con-
centrated order-driven markets, the relative opacity of dealership markets is more important,
16Trading halts are activated for diﬀerent reasons. Some of them are institutional like those related to
regulatory rules of information disclosure and others may be strategically demanded by market makers (see
Edelen and Gervais, 2003).
16strengthening the argument of higher traders’ aggressiveness in dealership markets. However,
concentration has a positive eﬀect on traders’ aggressiveness in auction markets. Indeed, con-
centration leads to a lower informational advantage for informed traders who may therefore
prefer to trade more aggressively in auction markets in order to compensate for their reduced
informational advantage. In accordance with this intuition, we prove the following:
Proposition 7 :F o raﬁnite M, when (N − 1) >
π (πv+π)
2π(π −π), traders in auction markets trade
more aggressively.
Thus, when traders’ number is suﬃciently high, the second (positive) eﬀect dominates since
strategies convey higher information and the marginal eﬀect of each trader is suﬃciently low
such that traders choose to be more aggressive in auction markets. With free entry, proposition
2p r o v e st h a tβ tends towards b0 that is higher than βD. Thus, trading is more aggressive in
auction markets in that case.
5.3 Price variance
Before receiving their private information and when they face the choice between market or-
ganizations, traders will be concerned with the ex ante price variances in both markets. Al-
ternatively, for regulators, price variance may be considered as a measure of price volatility
and could be an important argument for choosing the market structure featuring lower price
variance. From traders’ point of view, expected prices are the same in both structures. Thus,
because of their risk aversion the ex ante price variances may be considered as an important
parameter of comparison between markets.
Comparing price variances in dealership and fragmented order-driven markets, Madhavan
(1992) ﬁnds that price distortions caused by trading strategies of market makers lead to higher
price variance in order-driven markets. If we consider concentration in auction market, this price
distortions eﬀect is ampliﬁe ds i n c ew eh a v ei nt h i sc a s e( M+N)a g e n t sa ﬀecting the equilibrium
price. Nevertheless, an opposite eﬀect on price variance arises. Indeed, concentration reduces
the asymmetric information between traders and market makers; then, all agents learn more
information from their competitors’ strategies inducing lower price variance. In line with this
intuition, we prove the following.
Proposition 8 :W i t haﬁxed M,i fN<(πv
π )2, price variance is higher in auction markets;
when (N − 1) >
π 
2(πv+π)2−4π3(πv+π )
4π4 , price variance is lower.
17Hence, as suggested by the intuition, if N is suﬃciently low, price distortion eﬀect dominates
the informational eﬀect of concentration on price variance. However, when N is suﬃciently high,
information acquired by diﬀerent market participants involves lower price variance in auction
markets compared to dealership markets.
This result is supported by the empirical work in Jain (2002). In that work, it is documented
that price volatility is higher in dealership markets than in auction markets. Market volatility,
in each market, is measured by the price variance of the most active ﬁrms for which it is more
likely to have a larger N.
In conclusion, regulators preferring markets with lower price variability will opt for an
auction structure if they expect their market to be relatively deep (N high) and for a dealership
structure if they consider that their market will be relatively thin (N is low).
5.4 Informational eﬃciency
It results from Proposition 3 and Proposition 5 that prices are semi-strong form eﬃcient in
dealership markets but not in auction markets. This result is directly linked to the diﬀerence
of competition among liquidity providers. Price competition in dealership markets induces
prices to reﬂect all publicly available information, whereas, in auction markets, since they
are concentrated and market makers compete on quantities, each agent’s strategy inﬂuences
the equilibrium price leading to a non semi-strong form eﬃciency. With market making free
entry, auctions markets attain this level of eﬃciency. In that case, quantity based competition
converges, in terms of eﬃciency, to price based competition.
Note, however, that the semi-strong form eﬃciency of prices in dealership markets in this
model is due to the speciﬁc assumptions leading to the expected zero-proﬁts condition. When
we introduce asymmetric information between dealers (no mandatory last trade publication)
or the possibility of splitting trader’s order among dealers,17 this level of eﬃciency should
disappear.





This measure takes its values on [0,1], and the extreme values represent complete informa-
tional ineﬃciency or eﬃciency. It is zero (one) when p is completely uninformative (perfectly
17In this case, when dealers are symmetrically informed and with a certain level of transparency for markets,
Biais, Martimort and Rochet (2000) prove that dealers’ expected proﬁts are strictly higher than zero.
18informative) of the ﬁnal value e v.
Transparency of auction markets leads to higher information transmitted in the equilibrium
price, and then to higher degree of eﬃciency. This is the intuition of the following proposition.
Proposition 9 : If we use the informational eﬃciency measure deﬁned in equation (11), auc-
tion markets are more eﬃcient than dealership markets.
5.5 Market liquidity
Since the model we use in this work is static, we use price related measures of market liquidity.18
Market depth or bid-ask spread are the appropriate measures. Because equilibria are linear,
both measures lead to the same comparison. Let us then consider market depth as a measure
of market liquidity. We say that one market is more liquid if its depth is higher. Market depths
in auction and dealership markets are denoted respectively by ∆A and ∆D,w i t h
∆A =
(2 − N)π  +2 ( N − 1)π +( N − 1)ρβ
π (π  − π − ρβ)
and,
∆D =
πvρ2 − π πω(π  + πv)
ρπ πω
=
πv(π  − π) − π(π  + πv)
ρπ
.
Intuitively, because market depth is the eﬀect of individual orders on prices, concentration leads
to lower marginal eﬀect of each individual trader on prices. Then, concentrated markets seem
to be deeper. But, if we consider the second dimension distinguishing pure structures, i.e. the
timing of action for market participants, an opposite argument arises. Indeed, quote-driven
markets are deeper because price competition leads to a lower price sensitivity to trader’s
orders than in order-driven markets where competition between market makers is based on
quantities.19
18In a dynamic framework, another dimension of liquidity is the one related to immediacy cost for trading
over time (see for example Grossman and Miller, 1988).
19This argument may be proved using the equilibria derived in Madhavan (1992). In that work, if ∆∗
Q and
∆∗
O denote market depths in both markets (Q for quote-driven and O for order-driven), we have:
∆∗
Q = ∆D =





(M − 2)πvρ2 − Mπ πω(π  + πv)
(M − 1)ρπ πω
.
So
19Therefore, market participant’s timing of action and concentration have opposite eﬀects on
market depth, and once again, the liquidity based comparison between trading structures is
not obvious.
Because we do not have an explicit formulation of β, a direct comparison between ∆A and
∆D is not possible. Nevertheless, one can obviously see that for the bounds of β (i.e., zero
and b0), the diﬀerence between ∆A and ∆D is negative for the lower bound and positive for
the upper bound. Since, β is a continuous function of M, we conclude that if M is suﬃciently
large, concentrated order-driven markets are deeper than fragmented quote-driven markets.
Intuitively, if quantity-based competition between market makers is greater, or suﬃciently
“eﬃcient”, the positive eﬀect of concentration on depth dominates the negative eﬀect generated
b yt h et i m i n go fa c t i o no fm a r k e tp a r t i c i p a n t s .
From regulators’ point of view, enhancing liquidity in auction markets should be done by
encouraging market making, otherwise it is better for them to opt for a fragmented quote-
driven structure where liquidity is greater. Similarly, investors and ﬁrms, looking “greedily”
for liquidity when they face the choice of the market structure where they prefer to act or to
be quoted, should study the level of competition between market makers in auction markets.
If it is deemed suﬃciently eﬃcient, they will choose auction structure. Otherwise, it is optimal
for them to opt for dealership markets.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this work, we establish a comparison between two ﬁnancial market structures using the fact
that they diﬀer with respect to two dimensions: concentration and timing of action for diﬀerent
market participants. It turns out that some previous results on relative market performances
are no longer true when we consider both concentration and timing of action. For instance,
we proved that concentrated order-driven markets are less sensitive to asymmetric information
than fragmented quote-driven markets, while Madhavan (1992) argued the contrary. In the
same way, other results related to traders’ aggressiveness, price variability and market liquidity




πvρ2 + π πω(π  + πv)
(M − 1)ρπ πω
> 0.
20of these results are conﬁrmed by several recent empirical works.
Nevertheless, this analysis lacks some features of ﬁnancial market organizations that could
inﬂuence investors or regulators’ choices. Among others, we omitted the eﬀects of inventory
costs on liquidity providers’ strategies, and execution risk faced by limit orders’ submitters in
auction markets (while in dealership markets, market makers provide them with an insurance
against this risk).
For the latter, it is clear that introducing it as a parameter of choice for traders fosters
dealership markets. So, depending on the importance that each investor attributes to this
parameters relative to performances considered in our model, one can guess the choice of each
trader. For investors and ﬁrms, there exists other regulating parameters which could be consid-
ered when they are choosing a trading structure; examples of such parameters are transaction
fees and trading capacity of intermediaries.20
For inventory costs, strategies of liquidity providers would be diﬀerent in both markets and
their risk aversion measure will aﬀect diﬀerent market performances. However, it is not clear
whether this will be in favor of auction or dealership markets. An interesting ﬁeld of research
is to compare these market structures when we consider both the adverse selection and the
inventory costs paradigms.21
Moreover, in this work auction and dealership markets are compared in a context where
they are assumed to be separate entities. So, the interaction between them when both of them
exist is ignored. Several works22 however prove that this point may have an important eﬀect
over the performances of these structures and then over the investment strategies of investors
and the market structure choice of regulators.
Financial markets are rarely organized as pure fragmented quote-driven or centralized order-
driven. In fact, each one may be seen as an hybrid version of these extreme organizations. For
instance, at the Paris Bourse, which is organized as an electronic auction market, some trades
m a yb ee x e c u t e do nt h eo ﬀ-exchange markets23 so that trading is conducted without being
20See R¨ oell (1990) and Fishman and Longstaﬀ (1992).
21Brown and Zhang (1997) uses both paradigms to compare auction markets (termed limit order book mar-
kets) and another centralized order-driven market in which traders are compelled to submit market orders
(termed dealer markets). Then, the diﬀerence between these markets is based on the higher information for
dealers (observability of the traders’ order ﬂow) and the existence of the execution-price risk in their dealer
markets. See also Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) for an analysis of the eﬀects of introducing a competing
trading structure on dealer markets, where both asymmetric information and inventory costs are introduced.
22See for example Grossman (1990), Seppi (1990 and 1992) and Blume and Goldstein (1997) for a theoretical
analysis of the interaction between trading structures.
23Such tradings are called op´ erations de contrepartie.
21displayed on the screen (at least before its execution). On the New York Stock Exchange, there
is a monopolistic specialist for each stock which is in competition with market makers operating
via a centralized system. So, two natural questions arise: Is it possible to derive an optimal
trading structure as a combined version of the basic market organizations studied in this work?
and, how this optimal mechanism could depend on market features and regulators’ parameters
of choice?
22APPENDIX24
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1 :
This proposition is an extension of Madhavan (1992)’s fragmented order-driven equilibrium
construction. The proof constructs the linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium for auction markets
by solving for an agent’s best response to the conjectured strategies adopted by other agents
and then shows that these conjectures are consistent.
∗ step 1: Traders’ best replies
Suppose that a trader i with the information set Hi =( si,ω i) will conjecture that:
1. trading strategy for all j ∈ {1,...,N} and j 6= i is :
qj(p)=αµ + βsj − γωj − θp. (A.1)
2. the trading strategy of market maker m,f o ra l lm ∈ {1,....,M} is:
dm(p)=ζ(µ − p)( A . 2 )
where β and γ are positive constants.
For this trader, if he chooses qi, the market clearing condition is:
Mζ(µ − p)+qi +
X
j6=i
(αµ + βsj − γωj − θp)=0 .
Then, the equilibrium price satisﬁes the following equality:
p =[










(βsj − γωj)( A . 3 )
where λ =[ Mζ+( N − 1)θ]. From equation (2) the trading strategy qi(p)s a t i s ﬁes:
qi(p) ∈ argmax
qi
{E[˜ v/si,p,  d,   Q−i](ωi + qi) − qip −
ρ
2
var[˜ v/si,p,  d,   Q−i](ωi + qi)
2}.
Optimality conditions (the First and the Second Order Conditions) are
FOC : E[˜ v/si,p,  d,   Q−i] − p −
∂p






2 − ρvar[˜ v/si,p,  d,   Q−i] < 0. (A.5)
24Equations related to auction markets, dealership markets and comaprison analysis are respectively labeled
A, D and C.






2 = 0, then the optimal trading order for i is:
qi =
E[˜ v/si,p,  d,   Q−i] − p − ρvar[˜ v/si,p,  d,   Q−i]ωi
ρvar[˜ v/si,p,  d,   Q−i]+1
λ
.( A . 6 )





[λp − (Mζ+( N − 1)α)µ − qi]. (A.7)





















Given the equilibrium price, trader i observes a realization of ˜ zi;t h i sa l l o w sh i mt oa d j u s t
his beliefs about the ﬁnal value of the asset. Since all variables are normally distributed and
stochastically independent, the trader’s conditional expectation of ˜ v is:
E[˜ v/si,p,  d,   Q−i]=E[˜ v/si,z i]=
πvµ + π si +( N − 1)πzi
ψ
(A.9)
and the conditional variance is
var[˜ v/si,p,  d,   Q−i]=var[˜ v/si,z i]=ψ
−1 (A.10)




{µ[βπv − π(Mζ+( N − 1)α)] + βπ si − βρωi − p[ψβ − λπ]}
(A.11)
where r = βρ+ π + β
ψ
λ.
Then, the trading strategy of i has the conjectured form with α, β, γ,a n dθ satisfying the
following equations:
α =















24∗ step 2: dealers’ best replies
Suppose that the market maker m conjectures that traders’ strategies are described as in
(A.1) for j ∈ {1,....,N} and that the trading strategies of his competitors are: dl(p)=ζ(µ−p)
for all l ∈ {1,..,m − 1,m+1 ,...,M}.
F o rt h i sm a r k e tm a k e r ,i fh i so p t i m a lo r d e ri sdm(p), then the market clearing condition is:
dm(p)+( M − 1)ζ(µ − p)+
N X
j=1
(αµ + βsj − γωj − θp)=0 .
Therefore,
p = µ[










(βsj − γωj) (A.16)
with λm =( M − 1)ζ + Nθ.F r o me q u a t i o n( 3 ) ,dm(p)s a t i s ﬁes:
dm(p) ∈ argmaxdmE[(˜ v − p)dm(p)/Q,p,   Q,   d−m].
The optimality conditions are








2 < 0. (A.18)






2 = 0. Thus, from (A.17), the optimal trading order
of m is:
dm(p)=λm[E[˜ v/Q,p,   Q,   d−m] − p]. (A.19)




qj = Nαµ− Nθp+
N X
j=1
(βsj − γωj); (A.20)
then, given p and this observation, m should observe
zm =
Q − Nαµ+ Nθp
Nβ
. (A.21)










25Then, zm is a realization of a random variable ˜ zm =˜ v + e ym,w h e r ee ym is a centered normal
random variable with variance [Nπ]−1 where π is deﬁned in (A.8).
Consequently,




with ψm = πv + Nπ. Substituting (A.22) into (A.19) gives:
dm(p)={











This solution takes the form of market makers’ conjectured strategies when both terms are
equal to ζ. So we have
ζ =












∗ step 3: existence of the equilibrium
The equilibrium exists when the equations system (A.12), (A.13), (A.14), (A.15), (A.24)
and (A.25) for the ﬁve variables α, β, γ, θ and ζ has a solution.




π . Substitution into (A.8) allows us to conclude




π πω + ρ2.
Moreover, from (A.24) and (A.25) we have : θ = β + α. Therefore, if we substitute theses
values of θ and ζ into diﬀerent equations, the underlying system is simpliﬁed and we have to
solve a new system with only three variables:
Mζ +( N − 1)θ =
(πv +( N − 1)π)β − π α
π
(A.26)




]=πvβ − π[(M − 1)ζ + Nα] (A.28)
26In the following, we will endeavour to ﬁnd conditions under which a solution for this system
exists. From (A.27) we can write α as a function of β :
α =
β[(πv +( N − 1)π)(π  − π − ρβ) − πψ]
π (π  − π − ρβ)
(A.29)
and from (A.26) we have,
ζ =
πvβ − α(π  +( N − 1)π)
Mπ
. (A.30)
Then multiplying by (M − 1), adding Nθ and considering the fact that θ = α + β gives
[(M − 1)ζ + Nθ]=
β[((M − 1)πv + MNπ)β − α((M − 1)π  − (M + N − 1)π)]
Mπ
.
Substituting the value of α in (A.29) gives:
[(M − 1)ζ + Nθ]=
βψ[(2M + N − 2)π  − 2(M + N − 1)π − ρ(M + N − 1)β]






βψ[(2M + N − 2)π  − 2(M + N − 1)π − ρ(M + N − 1)β]
Mπ (π  − π − ρβ)
.
We will then derive another relation between [(M − 1)ζ + Nθ]a n dβ using equation (A.28).
From (A.26) we have:
[(M − 1)ζ + Nα]=
πvβ − α(π  − π)
π
− ζ.
Substitution into the right hand side of (A.28) and simpliﬁcation yield:
ζβψm
λm
= α(π  − π); (A.32)
substituting (A.30) and rearranging terms gives:
λm =
βψm[πvβ − α(π  +( N − 1)π)]
Mπα(π  − π)
. (A.33)
Finally, substitution of (A.29) into (A.33) and simpliﬁcation give the following second relation
between λm and β:
λm =
βψmψ[(2 − N)π  +2 ( N − 1)π +( N − 1)ρβ]
M(π  − π)[(πv +( N − 1)π)(π  − π − ρβ) − πψ]
Def = f(β). (A.34)
27From the second order condition of market makers’ maximization problem, λm has to be
strictly positive. Thus, equilibrium exists when f(β) > 0a n dg(β) > 0. This occurs when β>
sup{0,a 0} and β<b 0 (with a0 6= b0)w i t h :
a0 =











ρ(πv +( N − 1)π)
(note that b0 is always greater than a0 since πv > 0).
If b0 ≤ 0, f(.)i sn o td e ﬁned and the equilibrium does not exist; so b0 has to be positive.
Let us derive a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the equilibrium existence.
We can write the following








2 + X2ρβ + X3,
where
X1 = −[(N − 1)π ψm +( M + N − 1)(π  − π)(ψm − π)]
X2 =[ ( 2 N − 3)π  − 3(N − 1)π]π ψm +( π  − π)[(ψm − π)
[(3M +2 N − 3)π  − 3(M + N − 1)π] − (M + N − 1)πψ]
X3 =( π  − π){2πψ[(2M + N − 2)π  − 2(M + N − 1)π]−
π ψm[(2M +2 N − 4)π  − 2(M +2 N − 2)π]}. (A.35)
Since, K1(β) > 0f o ra l lβ ∈]0,b 0[, we should study the sign of h(.) in order to state the
equilibrium existence.
We can easily see that X1 < 0. Then h(.) is a concave function over R and it reaches its
maximum at b0 such that: b0 = −X2




(N − 1)π ψm[π  − π + ρa0]
2ρ[(N − 1)π ψm +( M + N − 1)(π  − π)(ψm − π)]
+
28Therefore, h(.) is a strictly increasing function on ]0;b0[ and, proving the equilibrium exis-
tence is equivalent to show that h(0) = X3 < 0; indeed, since f(β)−g(β) → +∞ when β → b0,
then h(b0) > 0, and if h(0) < 0, then from the intermediate value theorem we can conclude
that h(.) = 0 for some β0 ∈]0;b0[, and therefore that f(β0)=g(β0). Note also that by strict
monotonicity of h(.), this equilibrium is the unique linear symmetric equilibrium.
Now, rearranging the terms of (A.35) and considering the fact that (π  − π)(ψm − π)=
−πψ + π ψm yield the following equality
h(0) = X3 =2 ( π  − π)
2{[(2M + N − 2)π  − 2(M + N − 1)π](π − ψm)+Mπ ψm}.
Then, considering the fact that [(2M + N − 2)π  − 2(M + N − 1)π](ψm − π)i se q u a lt o
(M + N − 1)(π ψm − 2πψ)+π ((M − 1)πv + MNπ)
gives
h(0) = 2(π  − π)
2{π πv − (M + N − 1)(π ψm − 2πψ)}.
Therefore, equilibrium in auction markets exists if and only if:
π πv − (M + N − 1)(π ψm − 2πψ) < 0.
Substituting the equation deﬁning π as a function of π , πω and ρ, this condition can be written
as follows:
π [(M + N − 1)(2ψ − ψm)+πv]





Under this equilibrium existence condition, we can easily prove that trader’s second order
conditions are satisﬁed and that ζ, α, γ and θ are positive.
Lemma 1 :T h eﬁrst derivative of the measure of asymmetric information relative to liquidity








(π  − π)(ψm − π)[(2M + N − 2)π  − 2(M + N − 1)π +( M + N − 1)ρb0]
2ρ[(N − 1)π ψm +( M + N − 1)(π  − π)(ψm − π)]
then,
b0 − b0 = π [
ψm[(N − 1)πψ − π πv]+( π  − π)(ψm − π)[(M − 1)πv + MNπ]
2ρ(ψm − π)[(N − 1)π ψm +( M + N − 1)(π  − π)(ψm − π)]
]
which is positive when b0 is positive.








πω)= 2 ( M + N − 1)π3
 [N(M + N − 1)π +
(M +2 N − 2)πv]{π [N(M + N − 1)π +
(M + N − 2)πv]+( M + N − 2)πv
ρ2
πω}−2
Moreover, we can easily show that
π2
 [N(M + N − 1)π  +( M + N − 2)πv]
2 − 2(M + N − 1)
π3
 [N(M + N − 1)π  +( M +2 N − 2)πv]
=
π2
 [(M + N − 2)2πv
2 + N(N − 2)(M + N − 1)2π2
  +2 M(N − 2)(M + N − 1)π πv],
which is positive. Thus,
2(M + N − 1)π3
 [N(M + N − 1)π  +( M +2 N − 2)πv]
<
π2
 [N(M + N − 1)π  +( M + N − 2)πv]
2
<
[π [N(M + N − 1)π  +( M + N − 2)πv]+( M + N − 2)πv
ρ2
πω]2.
This ends the lemma’s proof.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n2 :
Consider β∗ = lim
M→+∞
β where β∗ ∈ ]0,b 0[a n dβ∗ must be diﬀerent from 0 since we consider
that, at the equilibrium, β>0 for all M>1a n dN>1.26
We have, for the equilibrium solution β:
lim
M→+∞







β∗ψ(2π  − 2π − ρβ∗)






β∗ψψm(−(N − 2)π  +2 ( N − 1)π + ρβ∗)
limM→+∞ M(π  − π)[(π  − π − ρβ∗)(πv +( N − 1)π) − πψ]
.
From (A.36), 0 < lim
M→+∞
g(β) < +∞; it results that
lim
M→+∞
{M(π  − π)[(π  − π − ρβ∗)(πv +( N − 1)π) − πψ]} 6= ∞.




{(π  − π)[(π  − π − ρβ∗)(πv +( N − 1)π) − πψ]} = 0 and from this equality
we conclude that: β∗ = b0. (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) follow directly from equations (A.27), (A.26)
and (A.13).
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n3 :
(i) The equilibrium price is equal to µ + 1
MζQ,t h e np and Q are equivalently informative







Substitution of zm and Q respectively from (A.21) and the market clearing condition (equation
(A.3)) yields the following equation of the conditional expectation of v:
E[˜ v/p]=






Substitution of (Mζ+ Nα)a n d( Mζ+ Nθ) from (A.26) as functions of β gives
E[˜ v/p]=
α(π  − π)
βψm
µ +
πψ(2π  − 2π − ρβ)
π ψm(π  − π − ρβ)
p
which is equal to p only when M → +∞.














Then after substituting the value of Mζ+ Nθ from (A.26), we have :
var(p)=
Nπ 
2(π  − π − ρβ)2
πψ2(2π  − 2π − ρβ)2; (A.37)




πψ2[1 + π −π
π −π−ρβ]2.
Since β is in ]0,b 0[t h e nvar(p)s a t i s ﬁes the following property:
Nπ
ψm




Thus, we can conclude that lim
N→+∞
var(p)=0 .
31(iii) The quoted bid-ask spread is equal to p(1) − p(−1) = 2
Mζ. From equation (A.30), if
we compute the limit of Mζ as M → +∞ by considering the fact that β → b0 we ﬁnd the
announced result.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n4 :
This proof is similar to the proof of proposition 1 in Madhavan (1992). For the sake of
completeness and in order to use some results derived in the proof we present it.
The equilibrium in dealership markets is deﬁned by the couple (p(q),q). Considering that
dealers set a diﬀerentiable price function p(.), then a trader i, with information (si,ω i), chooses
a trading strategy qi satisfying his optimality condition
qi ∈ argmaxE[U(˜ v(ωi + qi) − p(qi)qi)/p(.),H i]( D . 1 )
which is equivalent to





The ﬁrst and second order conditions are respectively
−p





πv + π 
< 0( D . 2 ’ )
Since, E[˜ v/si]=
πvµ+π si
πv+π  , S u b s t i t u t i o ni n( D . 2 )a n dr earrangement of terms give
πv + π 
π 
[p










Then, given his pricing function p(.), the dealer should observe a noisy valuation of the ﬁnal
asset’s value si −
ρ
π ωi.C o n s i d e r˜ z =˜ si −
ρ
π  ˜ ωi,t h e n˜ z = e v + e y0 with
e y0 ∼ N(0,π),














32Substitution of (D.3) and the π value into (D.4) and introduction of the fact that E[˜ v/z]=
E[˜ v/qi]=p(qi) gives the following equation
p
0(qi)qiπ πω(πv + π ) − p(qi)πvρ
2 + πvρ










where a = πvρ2 and b = π πω(πv + π ).
• First case: a = b
In this case, (D.6) is:
p




This is a ﬁrst order diﬀerential equation in p with a second member. Its solution is
p(qi)=µ + Cqi −
ρ
πv + π 
qi ln|qi|, (D.7)
where C is the integration constant. If C ≤ 0t h e nw eh a v ep(−qi) − p(qi)=−2cqi +
2
ρ
πv+π qi ln|qi|.T h u s , f o r a l l qi > 1w eh a v ep(−qi) − p(qi) > 0. This represents an arbi-
trage opportunity which will be eliminated by inter-dealer trading. Then, this cannot be an




πv + π 
(ln|qi| +1 )< 0.
Then, the order size has to be lower than exp(
C(πv+π )
ρ −1) to satisfy the dealer’s second order
condition, otherwise this condition will be violated. Thus, this cannot be an equilibrium.
• Second case: a 6= b
If we denote by
T(qi)=p(qi) − µ +
ρπ πω
b − a
qi;( D . 8 )






33The solution to this diﬀerential equation is
T(qi)=C1sign(qi)|qi|
a/b.
















(πv + π )(b − a)
. (D.11)





a/(π +πv) > 0,
in this case we have an arbitrage opportunity and then this cannot be an equilibrium.
If a<band C1 > 0 then from the trader’s second order condition we can prove the
existence of q∗ and q∗ such that this condition is violated for q/ ∈ [q∗,q∗]. Then, this cannot be
an equilibrium. Similarly, if a>band C1 < 0 the trader’s second order condition is violated
for some values of q.
Finally, if a>b ,a n dC1 ≥ 0, the second order condition is always satisﬁed, but these pricing















Given this pricing function we can easily derive the trader’s strategy by substituting the value
of p(qi) into (D.3) which gives:
qi(si,ω i)) =
πvρ2 − π πω(π  + πv)
ρ[πvρ2 + π πω(π  + πv)]
[−π µ + π si − ρωi].
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n5 :
(i) E[˜ v/p]=E[˜ v/E(˜ v/q)] = E[˜ v/q]=p, then prices in dealership market are semi-strong
form eﬃcient.




πvρ2 + π πω(π  + πv)






πv(ρ2 + π πω)


















After simpliﬁcation we can write:
var(p)=
π
(πv + π)2. (D.15)
(iii) The quoted bid-ask spread is deﬁned by p(1)−p(−1). In dealership markets, it is equal
to
2ρπ πω
πvρ2 − π πω(π  + πv)
. (D.16)
Given this relation we can easily prove that partial derivatives of the quoted bid-ask spread
equation relative to π , πω, ρ and πv are positive for the ﬁrst and second argument and negative
for the latter.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n6 :
(i) Auction markets are more viable if their equilibrium exists each time the equilibrium in
dealership markets exists. In other words, this is the case when:






[(M + N − 1)π [2ψ − ψm]+πv]





From the ﬁrst condition we have
π 
2πω(π  + πv) <π vπ ρ
2
or,
π(π  + πv) <π v(π  − π).
Therefore, we get
π πv >π (2πv + π ), (C.1)
35and
(π  − 2π) > 0. (C.2)
Now, we should prove that under these conditions, auction market’s equilibrium existence
condition is satisﬁed. We have:
(M + N − 1)(π ψm − 2πψ) − π πv =
(M + N − 2)π πv +( M + N − 1)[(N − 2)π  − πv +2 ( N − 1)π].
Using (C.1), we get:
(M + N − 1)(π ψm − 2πψ) − π πv >
π[(M + N − 1)(N − 1)(π  − 2π)+( M + N − 3)πv].
Since the right hand member of this equation is positive from (C.2), we have:
(M + N − 1)(π ψm − 2πψ) − π πv > 0.
(ii) Suppose that:










(M + N − 2)ρ2 − (M + N)π πω
− (N − 1)
π 
2πω




ρ2 − π πω
.
The second equation can be written as:
Mπ π
(M + N − 2)π  − 2(M + N − 1)π
− (N − 1)π<π v <
π π
π  − 2π
. (C.4)
By (C.3), we have (M + N − 2)π  − 2(M + N − 1)π>0, so π  − 2π>0.
Finally from these inequalities and (C.4), we have the following:
• πv[π  − 2π] − π π<0, then dealership market breaks down.
• (M + N − 1)[π ψm − 2πψ] − π πv > 0, then the equilibrium in auction markets exists.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n7 :
First, we can easily verify that 0 <β D <b 0. Then, in order to compare trading aggressive-
ness in both markets, it is suﬃcient to compute h(βD) (see proof of proposition 1). In fact,
since h(.) is an increasing function on ]0,b 0[a n dh(β)=0 ,i fh(βD) > 0t h e nβD >βand
conversely if h(βD) < 0.
36The function h(.) may also be written as follows:
h(β)= π ψm[π  − π − ρβ][(2 − N)π  +2 ( N − 1)π +( N − 1)ρβ]
−(π  − π)[(πv +( N − 1)π)(π  − π − ρβ) − πψ]
[(2M + N − 2)π  − 2(M + N − 1)π − (M + N − 1)ρβ];
then,
h(βD)= π{π ψm[2π  + πv − π][π (πv + π) − 2(N − 1)π(π  − π)]
−(π  − π)[2(π  − π)(πv +( N − 1)π) − π (πv + π)]
[(M − 1)π (πv + π)+2 ( M + N − 1)π(π  − π)]}.
If we consider the fact that equilibrium conditions in both markets are satisﬁed, and that
βD ∈]0,b 0[, we can argue that h(βD) < 0w h e n e v e r 27,
π (πv + π) − 2(N − 1)π(π  − π) < 0
which is equivalent to:
(N − 1) >
π (πv + π)
2π(π  − π)
.
In this case βD <βand trading is more aggressive in auction markets.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n8 :
From (A.38) we have
Nπ
ψm





and from (D.18), var(pD)= π
(πv+π)2.
( i )C o n s i d e rt h a tN<(πv
π )2. Then, (N − 1)[Nπ2 − πv
2] < 0. This is equivalent to (πv +
Nπ)2 − N(πv + π)2 < 0. Hence, var(pD) < Nπ
(πv+Nπ)2 <v a r (pA).
(ii) If (N − 1) >
π 
2(πv+π)2−4π3(πv+π )





Multiplying both sides by N and considering that Nπ <ψ,we can write 4π2ψ2−Nπ 
2(πv+π)2 >
0w h i c hi se q u i v a l e n tt o :
27Notice that this is just a suﬃcient condition for our result.
37π




then, var(pA) < Nπ 
2
4πψ2 <v a r (pD).
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n9 :









where the ﬁrst equation is derived from the deﬁnition of e and the fact that28 E[e v/p]=
E[e v/zm]=ψm = πv + Nπ;and, the second equation is derived from the deﬁnition of e and
(D.5).
A straightforward comparison between eA and eD gives the result.
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